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On 10 July 2020, the Turkish government published its decision to re-transform
the Hagia Sophia into a mosque in accordance with the decision of the highest
administrative court. Since then, discussions concerning the implications of this
decision continue. Besides the lack of legal consequences under international law,
I argue that the Hagia Sophia decision reveals a bigger issue in the contemporary
legal and political landscape of Turkey. Whereas secularization of the Republic of
Turkey made it possible for the Hagia Sophia to be accessed on an equal footing by
people of all faiths and for non-religious persons, the current regression concerning
the implementation of secularism in Turkey is concerning and may indirectly violate
Turkey’s international obligations. Lando Kirchmair on this blog already highlighted
the relevance of international law in particular within the UNESCO mechanisms, but I
would like to comment on two different aspects of the issue which are of international
legal significance.
Turkey’s international obligations under the ICESCR
While the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention provides the main framework
for the protection of cultural heritage, human rights law sheds light on the issue from
a different angle. Article 15(a) of the ICESCR provides for the right of everyone to
take part in cultural life. The ICESCR’s Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (CESCR) observed in paragraph 15(b) of General Comment No. 21 that
everyone has the right to benefit from cultural heritages, the Committee emphasized
that
‘In many instances, the obligations to respect and to protect freedoms,
cultural heritage and diversity are interconnected.’ (para. 50)
Furthermore, the Committee added that the ICESCR’s article 15 obliges State
Parties to respect and protect cultural heritage ‘in order to encourage creativity in all
its diversity and to inspire a genuine dialogue between cultures’ (para. 50 (a)). Thus,
the duty to protect cultural heritage entails the duty of preservation. Whether Turkey
has violated article 15(a) of the ICESCR is, however, is doubtful. The changing of the
status of the Hagia Sophia by converting it back to a mosque does not itself appear
to violate Turkey’s duties concerning the protection or preservation of the Hagia
Sophia’s cultural heritage. Especially, because governmental officials of Turkey
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stated that the Hagia Sophia Mosque will still be open for everyone and its historical
mosaics with other historical components will be preserved. In any event, just as
Kirchmair observed in connection with the UNESCO mechanisms, the ICESCR, too,
lacks effective enforcement mechanisms.
A threat to inter-faith co-existence and secular spaces?
Besides concerns regarding Turkey’s duties to protect its cultural heritage, according
to Karima Bennoune and Ahmed Shaheed, respectively the UN’s Special Rapporteur
in the field of cultural rights and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or
belief, the Turkish government’s re-purposing of the Hagia Sophia is also a concern
for the  ‘inter-faith co-existence and secular spaces’ in Turkey. As Bertil Oder
suggested, the Hagia Sophia decision is one of the issues that is
‘apt to raise the tension between the progressive segments of the society
and the government, while they consolidate the government’s religiously
motivated, nationalistic, and socially conservative base.’
The UN’s Special Rapporteurs also noted that the language used in connection
with the Hagia Sophia’s transformation and the fact that the head of the Turkish
state’s Presidency of Religious Affairs held a sword during the first prayer in the
re-converted Hagia Sophia appeals to notions of conquest and may reflect the
government’s supremacist view of history and culture. I believe that this concern
deserves particular attention due to the fact that the Turkish government is
determinedto invoke traditional Ottoman historical views of cultural and religious
supremacy vis-à-vis the Christian minority. Indeed, R#za Türmen, former ECtHR
judge and diplomat, and the legal scholar I##l Kurnaz recently claimed that the
decision to turn the Hagia Sophia into a museum in 1934 was a reflection of the
attention given and the importance attached to secularism and diversity by the
new republic. They added that, against that background, the government’s recent
decision appears to be informed by exactly the opposite of these considerations.
Their argument is supported by the fact that on 30 July Turkey’s presidential
spokesman tweeted on his official Twitter account:
“We have been told the stories of others under the name of modernization
for 150 years. It is time to write our own story.”
This brings us to domestic and international legal aspects of the secularism principle.
The Turkish constitution recognizes the principle of secularism in its preamble and
provides that sacred religious feelings shall not be involved in state affairs and
politics. Furthermore, article 136 of the Constitution, which regulates principal limits
of the authority of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, prescribes that the Presidency
‘shall exercise its duties […] in accordance with the principles of secularism,
removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity
and integrity”.
Thus, to invoke notions and symbols of conquest like the sword during prayers is
difficult to square with that article and does not serve national solidarity and integrity
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of different religious communities. Indeed, I argue that this recent practice of the
Turkish government goes against the letter and spirit of article 136 and the principle
of secularism as enshrined in the Turkish Constitution.
Does the ECHR protect secularism?
 When the principle of secularism is not implemented at the domestic level,
international law does not oblige Turkey to be secular in order to protect cultural
diversity. In fact, Ahmed Shaheed emphasized in 2018 that the international human
rights law does not oblige States to accord a particular relationship between the
State and religion (para. 75). Due to the fact that its case law is relatively more
diverse and complex with regard to the principle of secularism, I will assess the
interpretation of the principle under the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR).
In the past, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) interpretation of the
ECHR regarding the secularism principle and underlying values of the Convention
has been inconsistent. In Leyla #ahin v. Turkey, for example, the ECtHR recognized
secularism as a principle consistent with the underlying values of the ECHR, and
more importantly, as a key value of a democratic society (para. 114). Moreover, in a
recently published research paper by the Court ECtHR, concerning the application
of Islamic law in the domestic legal order, the ECtHR observed, based on its case
law, that a legal system based on Shari’a law is not compatible with the fundamental
values of the ECHR. However, in Lautsi and others v. Italy the ECtHR considered
secularism to be one of the philosophical convictions that inform the ECHR, but not
as a key value of the Convention (para. 58). Indeed, with reference to the presence
of crucifixes in schools, the ECtHR explicitly stated that it is not the ECtHR’s
mission to examine to which extent states comply with the principle of secularism
as enshrined in domestic law (para. 57). Yet, judge Giovanni Bonello, was very
clear on one point that “In Europe, secularism is optional, freedom of religion is
not.” (para. 2.5). The ECHR does not empower the ECtHR to coerce countries into
religious neutrality (para. 2.3). Yet,  the ECHR promotes secularism as a means to
protect and guarantee freedom of religion  but does not consider it to be the only way
freedom of religion can be guaranteed.
At first sight, it may seem as if the ECtHR interprets the ECHR in a way that is
politically neutral between different ideologies with regard to a state’s relationship
with religions. Undoubtedly, the ECtHR’s interpretation of the secular principle allows
for different kinds of relationships between governments and religious institutions
(like churches or Islamic sects) within the Contracting States. However, as Susan
Marks suggested before, the claim that human rights and their adjudication is
somehow neutral and ‘beyond politics’ is in itself a political claim. International
human rights law’s ambivalent relationship with the secularism principle is therefore
also a political one and it opens a door for governments to invoke alleged religious
ideologies and values when arguing in favour of or against domestic reforms. The
Hagia Sophia decision is a case in point because Turkey’s regression concerning the
implementation of the secularism principle can be considered the ‘root cause’ of the
recent decision and of the possible violations of cultural rights.
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Conclusion
After Lando Kirchmair’s showed that the legal sanctions within the UNESCO
mechanisms that attach to the Turkish government’s recent decision to convert
the Hagia Sophia back to a mosque are ‘toothless’, this post suggests that the
legal ground for sanctions under ICESCR is weak, too. However, the ECHR may
be interpreted in a way to hold its member states to a higher standard. With the
ECtHR’s recognition of the historical importance of the principle of secularism in
Leyla #ahin v. Turkey, I argue that the secularism principle in the Turkish constitution
is still the main safeguard for the peaceful existence for people of all faiths and
non-religious persons on an equal footing under the ECHR. And I believe that the
defence of secularism is crucial whenever it is called into question – as it was by
Turkey’s recent Hagia Sophia decision – since it is the precondition for protecting
cultural diversity, gender equality, and equality before the law.
 
Ar#nç Onat K#l#ç is a graduate from Istanbul University and currently attending the
International Human Rights Law master program at Lund University with a master’s
scholarship from the Swedish Institute.
 
Cite as: Ar#nç Onat K#l#ç, “Creeping diversion from secularism in Turkey
– How the Hagia Sophia decision poses a threat to inter-faith co-existence,
secular spaces and freedom of religion”, Völkerrechtsblog, 24 August 2020.
- 4 -
